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Abstract
As much as the event following 9/11 triggered massive changes in our understanding of
privacy rights and increased our level of acceptance of government infringement on indi-
viduals’ freedom, the pandemic of the SARS-COV-2 is threatening to change our under-
standing of societal hierarchy and democratic process. In this essay, we imagine a society
where two classes, defined by their susceptibility to infection, emerge, and a neo-feudal sys-
tem is established. We suggest that it is possible to evaluate how likely a dystopian outcome
is by usingMachiavelli’s understanding of the impact of the Plague on medieval Florence.
We also recommend following his advice to avoid such a drift by reaffirming the primacy
of politics over scientism.
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1 Introduction
There used to be a world when hopping on a plane carrying food and water, without spending
too much time in a security check line or carrying biometric IDs all the time, was the norm.
It was a world that was not full of cameras, and facial recognition was, at best, the dream of a
minority of sci-fi enthusiasts. On September 11th, 2001, however, when two planes crashed
into the TwinTowers of theWorld Trade Center inNewYorkCity, killing nearly 3,000 people
and injuring more than 6,000 others, that world changed forever. As terrorism targeted the
United States and its European allies, the whole world was told that the quickly implemented
invasive security measures were temporary, and that a return to normal life was expected, for
everybody, as soon as possible. Nevertheless, after almost twenty years from that terrible day,
that world never came back, and we are now living in a new normal where, for instance, board-
ing a plane has become almost as complicated as breaking out of jail. An everyday life where
more and more security layers are added, one after another, theoretically to prevent a tragedy
like 9/11 from happening again. We nevermade it back to the world prior to 9/11 and it seems
as though we may not return to it anytime soon.
Most importantly, the events following 9/11 triggered massive changes in our understand-
ing of privacy rights, the limitations thereof, and increased our level of acceptance of govern-
ment infringement on individuals’ freedom to preserve society’s greater good (Ravich, 2005;
Rotenberg, 2006; Thompson, 2005; Westin, 2003). The principle that individual rights are
subject to society’s interests has not only been accepted but ultimately sought-after by many
(Olssen, 2008; Sullivan&Hendriks, 2009). Scholars inmany fields, frompsychology (Chanley,
2002; Morgan et al., 2011) to philosophy (Turner, 2020), to legal and security studies (Banks,
2009; Enders & Sandler, 2005) and sociology (Davis, 2005; Foner, 2005), have ever since de-
bated over these complex issues. However, as of today, there is no consensus on whether the
status quo has delivered a trade-off that constitutes a betterment or a worsening of the hu-
man condition (Cavoukian, 2017; Irani, 2015; Roach, 2011; Rhoads& Smithey, 2007; Steeves,
2019; Warwick, 2014). Today, once again, we find ourselves facing the same dilemma but on
a much more abysmal scale as we are not called upon making decisions after the fact (i.e., after
the tragedy of the Twin Towers has unfolded), but amid the uncertain development of a crisis
we still do not see an end to.
Ever since the pandemic of the SARS-COV-2 virus, and the disease that causes COVID-19,
has started, bringing the needof physical distancing, isolation, and sanitationmeasures thatwas
unprecedented in the last 100 years (Franchini et al., 2020; Long, 2020), we have been told that
“we will return to normal as soon as possible.” However, thinking back to the events of 9/11,
do we believe a return to the old normal is even possible? Or, most likely, must we prepare to
adapt to brand-new normality where, simply put, several pre-pandemic behaviors that were so
ingrained in our cultural understanding of social life will be eventually considered deviance?
Furthermore, what would this new normality look like?
Much along the same lines as the increased attention given to the theme of security after
9/11 and its consequences on the role of government in our daily lives (Body-Gendrot, 2010;
Bossong, 2012), the measures implemented since the inception of the pandemic crisis are pri-
marily dealing with ways of controlling the body of individual citizens (Lyon, 2006) so that, by
extension, we could preserve the health of the social body. Based on this previous experience,
the state’s more invasive role (Bloss, 2007; Goldsmith, 2012, Scheppele, 2004) in determining
what is socially acceptable in terms of social andphysical interactions is not only expectedby the
public but, under certain circumstances, can be politically rewarding (Cohen et al., 2005; Kell-
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ner, 2015). In the United States, for example, the political agenda has already been colonized
by the issue of controlling physical interactions and monitoring individual health (Briscese et
al., 2020), with most citizens certainly expecting the government to enforce science-based limi-
tations over individual behaviors but, more so, with an increasing share of the population even
demanding them, as to them public health is valued higher than individual rights concerning
their own body (Painter & Qiu, 2020). Self-isolation has now become a virtue, and people
who will not or cannot practice it are increasingly stigmatized, accused of threatening public
health, and ultimately censored (Everett et al., 2020; Prosser et al., 2020). This polarizing frac-
ture in the United States, which is not exclusive to public health but started with the issue of
climate change (see for example Antonio&Brulle, 2011; Fisher et al., 2013;McCright &Dun-
lap, 2011), has shaped a struggle between a conservative and a liberal political field (Barrios
& Hochberg, 2020; Jiang et al., 2020). From a legislative perspective, conservatives and liber-
tarians, who do not favor more regulation, try to roll back several pieces of federal legislation
they consider unlawful limitations of individual freedoms, andpromote extensive deregulation
policies where they are in control of local governments. Progressives, on the other hand, have
worked to increase regulation. From a broader perspective, while the former has apparently
rejected science as a way to inform social behavior and political decisions, putting the naïve no-
tion of protecting “God-given” individual rights at the top of its priority, the latter succeeded
in hijacking the very idea of science and, often by repacking it into a simplistic and scientis-
tic fashion, continually uses it to justify its political actions and claims of moral superiority
(Beiner, 1992; Lakoff, 2010; Segerstrale, 2000). In the social media bubble, this strategy has
also become a convenient way to silence conflicting voices, labeled on a scale from “stupid” to,
at best, “controversial,” and completely avoid any serious debate. By itself, this is already a pro-
found change to the way we understand society and practice democracy that is certainly worth
investigation.
In this essay, however, we do not aim to focus on such interesting political issues, not to
analyze the reactions to the current pandemic as a pure securitization problem (Nunes, 2020;
Stott et al., 2020). Instead, we aim to offer a thought experiment into how the consequences of
containment andmitigation policies could result in a dramatic shift towards a non-democratic
system. By imagining an extreme, dystopian, neo-feudal system, we explore a way the COVID-
19 pandemic could contribute to promote significant system changes in society and thereby ac-
celerate a substantial push towards a tyrannical regime. Certainly, entertaining the possibility
of a fully dystopian society materializing in our time could be labeled as implausible or utterly
ridiculous if presented as a prophecy or prediction. We want to reassure the reader that this is
not the case, and we opted for an extreme scenario only as a Weberian ideal type. But again,
nobody besides fiction predicted our current post 9/11 society, and we have seen attempts to
realize a dreamlike society happening before and almost every time turning into nightmares
(Kunkel, 2008). Instead of looking at such a dystopian society through the habitual lenses
of Marxism (Spracklen, 2015) or Classical Liberal philosophy (Tufan, 2017), we believe such
a scenario could be better analyzed through a political theory framework inspired from the
works of the Renaissance philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli. There are, of course, several im-
portant limitations to our thought experiment, which we do not mean as a forecast for the
immediate future, but only to entertain the idea of some potential unexpected consequences
of the pandemic crisis. For example, we rely on incomplete information on the still evolving
COVID-19 pandemic and the research for a vaccine. Also, we assume a very simplified mech-
anism of power transition and we do not address the complexities, and resilience, of actual
democratic institutions. Finally, we look at science in the form of a quasi-religious social insti-
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tution, functionally equivalent to religion and a major driver of authoritarianism, and we do
not discuss how the increasing involvement of science in the political conflict could promote
democracy instead. With all these limitations, we propose to focus instead on the notions of
“body sovereignty” and “bio-feudalism” to understand how itwould operate andwhat the risks
are to the endurance of the democratic process.
2 Body Sovereignty and Bio-Feudalism
Body sovereignty is a straightforward, yet powerful, idea; that each person has the right to fully
control their own body (Gillon, 2020; Wilson, 2015; Ecks, 2004). It is also common sense to
consider body sovereignty as the foundation of any other individual rights and, by extension, to
state sovereignty. However, its implications are complex, multifaceted, spanning from repro-
ductive rights to euthanasia, gender transitions, and much more. As scholars studying body
sovereignty, traditionally, assume that exercising it hardly impairs others’ safety, we have re-
cently struggled with the limitations of the concept in dealing with vaccinations, a complex
public health issue (see for example Capurro et al., 2018; Gobo, 2020; Vanderslott, 2019).
What about following a pandemic crisis? If the “jury is still out” on whether allowing a mi-
nority of individuals to waive mandatory vaccinations, based off religious or safety concerns,
for example, could weaken herd immunity for good or not (DeRoo et al., 2020; Thunstrom et
al., 2020), we will probably not extend the same courtesy to the recent COVID-19 pandemic
disease, if not to a very limited amount of individuals for exclusively medical reasons, or take
any chances that an event like this would happen again. Even if governments around the world
were to adopt a less strict policy than a mandatory mass vaccination plan, and given the fact
that is unclear if a vaccine against this specific coronavirus will offer long-lasting and broad pro-
tection against future viruses of the same class (McAleer, 2020), it seems plausible that most
countrieswill also need, at somepoint, to create a technological infrastructure to extinguish the
progression of future outbreaks quickly. To operate efficiently, such infrastructure will surely
include a network-level system of tracking, like the one put in place in South Korea, Germany,
Italy, and currently planned in several other countries, that could eventually and permanently
monitor every individual and social interactions.
The protocol is relatively standard: upon diagnosis, an infected individual will be required
to isolate, and precautions will be taken for any other individuals the subject has come in con-
tact with. In most cases, as it happens now in several European and Asian countries, participa-
tion in this program would be voluntary and anonymous. Still, it is not hard to imagine how
— through social pressure and a fast-emerging punishment/reward structure— it will become
a de facto diffused enhanced surveillance network. Submitted to public health concerns, body
sovereignty will then be indefinitely voided or limited to the immunes, as infected and poten-
tial ones will be deemed a public concern. For example, if an individual refuses to cooperate
and abide by regulations, their general movement, such as work activities, social gatherings and
big events, could be hindered or prevented; consequentially, theywill be treated along the same
lines as criminals, terrorists, or other radicalized individuals. But with two substantial qualita-
tive differences. First, becoming a criminal, a terrorist, or radicalized, is, in most cases, the end
of a long-term process and a voluntary act (Akins &Winfree, 2016; Silke & Brown, 2016; Bo-
rum, 2010), whereas becoming infected with a virus is, by definition, accidental. More so than
religion or ethnicity, it lacks the elements of choice and individual responsibility. Second, this
label is exceptionally volatile because people can gain or lose their immunity status following
reinfection or the introduction of a new virus in society. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine
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that the quality of immune might acquire the same value and transience of the old medieval
status of a freeman, a condition that comes with substantial political power over non-free indi-
viduals. At that point, through the demise of body sovereignty, the idea of individual freedom
might change forever and eventuallymodify our understanding of the democratic process from
universal to mostly limited to the immunes.
As we define a biological threat as a repeated game, a possible objection is that it would be
implausible for any individual to maintain their immunity status over a long period of time
without any external intervention, such as a vaccine. However, epidemiological studies of pan-
demic diseases (see for example Silk et al., 2017; Vasylyeva et al., 2016; El-Sayed et al., 2012;
Stattner & Vidot, 2011; Périssé & Nery, 2007) suggest how, most of the time, infections’ be-
havior is predictably contained in specific social networks and neighbors. Therefore, in a highly
stratified society, with very distinct groups, such as the one we imagine in this essay, it would
be relatively easy for the immunes to isolate themselves from the susceptible. Moreover, since
new pandemic events historically appear to be cyclical, occurring every one-hundred years or
so, (Dunning et al., 2020), we can reasonably assume a relatively short period of stability of the
established bio-classes. A new pandemic event, or a similar extinction-level event, could hypo-
thetically act as a form of reorganization of the social body, which will functionally prevent its
stagnation and provide a fresh stimulus for individual improvement in a system that otherwise
would not allow upward social mobility. Such an event, however, is not accounted for in this
essay.
Just theorizing the possibility of a hypothetical scenario, the most dramatic change in our
societal landscape since 9/11, where citizens can be labeled as quasi-public enemies based on
a blood test, sparks several fundamental questions that social scientists have already started to
reflect upon (Stark, 2020; Marres & Stark, 2020). From a political science perspective some of
these questions are: To what extent would individuals belonging to each of them be signaled,
recognized, and policed? Will those new bio-classes be given different political, social, and eco-
nomic rights? Would a distinction between immunes, susceptibles, and infected be the future
of social classes? Would the tracing system operate independently from the political system
of democratic institutions? Would this system eventually be politically weaponized and used
as a trojan horse to control and manipulate citizenries into compliance while expunging the
marginalized and non-conforming? All these questions can constitute a comprehensive reflec-
tion of a new social system that can be labeled as “bio-feudalism.” A foreseeable change in our
understanding of how body sovereignty operates and, mainly, how it will be limited to pre-
vent threats to society, particularly biological threats, could eventually set up the foundation
for a new social hierarchy. The core principle of which will be to avoid democracy to get in
the way of public health. The feudal system was defined by Bloch (2014/1939) as the “con-
tinuing assertion and enforcement of ownership” over land and “the extraction of rent from
peasants continuing to till the soil.” Consistently with the centrality of the land to the feu-
dal experience, the concept of “bio-feudalism” was initially suggested to describe a situation
where small farmers’ profits are limited by multinational control of seed property rights (Her-
ring, 2010). Scholars who engaged with it utilized the concept to compare the contemporary
world of agriculture to the rigid structure of medieval times and likened corporations to an-
cient feudatories forcing small farmers into servitude by exploiting unlimited property rights
over seeds and, by extension, crops (Herring, 2015). Our suggestion is to extend the concept
beyond land, or agricultural relationship, to a situationwheremembership in a social class, and
immaterial servitude as well as other inter-class interactions, is determined by biological affinity.
We imagine such a social system deemed possible by the increased relevance of Biopower and
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Biopolitics as described by Michel Foucault (1990/1976). For Foucault (McWhorter, 2004),
Biopower is a form of power exerted by experts that allows for the control of entire populations
by penetrating traditional forms of political power. According to Foucault, Biopower does not
replace repressive and deductive functions of power. In contrast, he claims that the emergence
of Biopower as the primary form of power implies that the rule of law has subsided in favor
of capitalistic regulative and corrective mechanisms based exclusively on scientific knowledge
whichmade possible “the controlled insertion of bodies into themachinery of production and
the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes.”
In the hypothesized society, such Foucaultian processes will not be determined merely by
kin, census, or deliberate choices, but by susceptibility to infection and enforced based on the
principle that the social body’s best interest overrules individual rights and liberty. Some indi-
viduals will be labeled as being at risk of becoming victims or super-spreaders of the disease and
will be highly monitored and limited in their behaviors and democratic participation rights,
thereby ending towards the bottom of the social ladder. In contrast, low-risk individuals will
be givenmore freedom andmore substantial rights. For simplicity, we can conjecture that such
a new hierarchywill consist primarily of the two (bio)classes. The first onewill be composed of
immunes and individuals who can afford to shield themselves from the infection through so-
cial distancing or potentially costly medical treatments in which the vaccinemight not be com-
pletely effective in preventing the development of the disease. The second one will be entirely
composed of susceptibles; those who, for either medical reasons or because their profession
does not allow them to engage in safe behavior, are most likely to become infected and spread
the infection to others. Both groups will be extremely homogenous from a socio-economic sta-
tus perspective, as well as in their behaviors and lifestyles; a fact that will reinforce segregation
and prevent social mobility. Finally, infected will be removed and reintegrated into society as
needed, and the class of susceptible further specified based on their risk of becoming infected.
We argue that immunes will eventually develop into a form of aristocracy or the ruling elite. In
contrast, the susceptibles, mostly essential workers, will constitute the new plebeians, thereby
establishing a system of interdependence like what was experienced under medieval Feudalism.
We are aware of the fact that some immunesmight be excluded from the ruling class due to their
low socio-economic status. We argue, however, that immunity will be a conditio sine qua non
to belong to this new aristocracy. In this system, full participation in political decision making
will be eventually granted almost exclusively to the immunes. In contrast, the susceptible will
only have a nominal right to be heard, not much unlike an ancient feudal society. In exchange
for their labor, they will be granted protection and economic stability partially independent
from their productivity through, for example, a form of universal income and relative welfare
protection, all of that will increase their dependency from the ruling elite. In such an extreme
scenario, the very idea of democracy will change and, rather than being universal, become a
concern limited to the ruling class, which will probably maintain it internally. At the end of
the day, the safety of the social body must be preserved from any attempt of the infected to re-
verse, through a vote, what is sanctioned by scientific evidence, especially in order to protect the
weakest members of society. The amount of freedom given to the immunes will resonate with
some of the arguments of the debate around the notion of “liberal Eugenics” (Fox, 2007). Lib-
eral Eugenics postulates that the ideal form of genetic control is to leave decisions about what
sort of people to produce in the hands of individual parents, absent government intervention.
In our example, such level of control will only be given to the immunes, whereas the suscep-
tibles will be forced to accept the formers’ decisions. Given the increasingly popular narrative
that sees science as able to make “better” policy decisions than politics, a representative system
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1971-8853/11420 30
SARS-COV-2 and the (Dark) Future of Society Sociologica. V.14N.3 (2020)
of divergent interests might not be needed in a paternalistic environment (Saint-Paul, 2011).
The important question is, therefore, if there exist any incentive for the government and other
political actors, such as corporations, to allow such a dramatic shift? We believe the answer is
yes and is to be found in the nature of the system itself, as outlined by Niccolò Machiavelli.
3 Machiavelli and the Plague
What does Machiavelli have to do with COVID-19 and our hypothetical dystopian endgame?
To begin discussing the applications of his work on the future of our political institutions, we
need to start fromhis ownexperiencewith the severalwaves ofPlague, theBlackDeath, that rav-
aged the Italian peninsula during his lifetime. Readers ofThePrince (2008/1532) already know
that Machiavelli was fond of utilizing diseases as a metaphor for the corruption of the “body
politic,” a medieval anatomical metaphor that likens the state to a corporation (Orum, 1978;
Chroust, 1947). However, most people might not be aware that the Plague, what we would
call the pandemic in modern times, played an actual role in the development of Machiavelli’s
political philosophy. According to several historians (see for example Ridolfi, 2013; Najemy,
2010; Viroli, 2002), experiencing the Plague directly impactedMachiavelli’s understanding of
statecraft. The Italian political philosopher was primarily fascinated by its effects on society.
Naturally, some of his intuitions about the infection mechanisms are incredibly naïve to us,
but, if viewed in context, his comprehensive political analysis of the Plague’s effects on society
closely resembles today’s experience with COVID-19. Furthermore, his ideas about how we
should handle crises seem as relevant as ever to pandemics. Thus, some of his advice could be
seen as a plan on how statesmen should address a pandemic to reduce the impact on the state’s
life (Fuchs, 2020; Freeman, 2009).
Let us peek more into Machiavelli’s plagued world. Having been endemic to the Italian
peninsula since 1348, the shadow of the bubonic Plaguewould accompany him formost of his
career as an adviser to the Medici’s dynasty. Before his time came to pass, he would witness at
least five outbreaks and even feared for his life or the ones of his family. ToMachiavelli, much
likely tomany of us experiencingCOVID-19,most of whatmade the disease terrifyingwas not
knowingmuch about it. Almost everything about the Plague was a mystery tomedicine of the
time, and such uncertainty made treatment as well as prevention difficult, if not impossible.
The lack of predictability of the Plague, much as what is now happening with COVID-19,
made its epidemiological effects even more devastating. As casualties increased, fear took hold,
and society started coming apart, thereby increasing the death toll in a vicious cycle. It was not
unexpected, however. In the Decameron (2019/1350), Boccaccio described society’s reaction
to diseases. The rich generally fled the city for the countryside, while the poor were forced to
remain in their houses. Not unlikely towhatwe see today, while some tried tominimize the risk
by living in quasi-complete isolation, others decided a better way to approach the Plaguewas to
get drunk and enjoy life to its fullest or ignore it as one enormous fake news. In Machiavelli’s
Florence, little had changed. Whether citizens chose to flee or remained at home, economic
activity in the city eventually halted, and many found themselves out of work and financially
broken; credit dried up as bankers refused to lend money to those who had no income and
might as well die before the loan could be repaid (Caferro, 2013).
By the same token, even themost basic necessities suddenly became a rarity or outrageously
expensive. Inevitably, the poor were the hardest hit. Florence’s government tried to handle the
outbreaks as best as it could by building plague hospitals (Lazzaretto) and imposing a manda-
tory quarantine. The city gates were closed both ways, while efforts were made to alleviate the
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suffering of those impacted the most by the economic crisis. In 1383, officials were authorized
to “lend” the food to the poor from the commune’s reserves and take whatever steps to assure
the grain supply lasted, including expropriating from those who had hoarded it. In 1417, sev-
eral members of the city’s elite demanded that the poor be subsidized, and argued that the rich
should pay the price of helping them through forced loans or, in some cases, expropriation
(Carmichael, 1983; 2014).
The problem was that all these measures rarely worked (Henderson, 2019; Manetti et al.,
2017; Aberth, 2016; Alfani, 2013). As the infection spread and hospitals were overwhelmed,
the citizens of Florence resisted confinement. Then, quarantine brought resentment, and food
shortages led to anger. During a crisis like that, as Machiavelli would say, if left unchecked,
widespread frustration would quickly boil over into public disorder and result in an increase
of crime. For him, that was also the most disconcerting feature of any crisis. In The Prince
and Discourses (2009), he pointed out that any state’s success depended on a delicate balance
between social classes. It was clear to him that if the order was to be preserved, a more effective
way of containing the crisis, minimizing economic suffering, andmaintaining public safetywas
needed. As a result, the advice ofMachiavelli can therefore function as a brilliant guide on how
governments must act during an epidemic or pandemic outbreak.
As he explains, the key in a crisis is for a government to realize how dangerous their good
intentions are or, as sometimes we say today, that “the road to hell is paved with good inten-
tions.” It was apparent to him that the virtues of honesty, generosity, and compassion risked
causing panic, bankrupting the state, and encouraging dissent or civil unrest, while doing noth-
ing to mitigate the infection. As such, unsurprisingly to anyone who is familiar with his work,
Machiavelli cynically suggested that Princes should refrain frombeing virtuous. Therefore, the
first step in his playbookwas to be frugal with the truth, not allowing toomuch information to
circulate freely. The second step he recommended, was to keep a fiscally conservative posture.
Whereas some public aid is undoubtedly necessary, Machiavelli insists that care must be taken
to ensure that it did not come at the expense of excessive taxes. Finally, the Prince should use
soldiers to increase the fear of retaliation. Given that people always seem not to be frightened
enough, for example by the Plague, to control their selfish instincts, the government’s only
chance of combating the disease is to punish infractions so severely that they would be too ter-
rified to do anything. These are, evidently, draconian principles worthy of a Greek tyrant but,
according toMachiavelli, the onlyway to avoid the collapse of society. Still, later, the Florentine
government took the advice and implemented what we would like to label as a Machiavellian
response to the Plague. When the disease struck again in 1630, a survey of the city’s needs was
conducted to assess how much food would be needed to minimize health hazards. Informa-
tion was carefully controlled and, before the infection spiked, the government enforced a rigid
lockdown policy, which included harsh penalties for the transgressors. According to historical
epidemiological data (Cohn, 2008), all these measures kept fatalities to a minimum and, most
crucially, protected the political institutions of the time so that after the wave passed, things
could go back to normal.
COVID-19 bears little, if no, biological resemblance to the Plague, but the world it has
created, with all its dramatic social and political dynamics, is not far from the one that Machi-
avelli experienced. Starting in March 2020, all over the world, we witnessed hoarding, scarcity
of resources, price increases, and a historical spike in unemployment and business bankruptcy
(Atkeson, 2020; Nicola et al., 2020). An information war burst on social media, while many
governments were accused of hiding facts to the public, a battle for authority started between
politics and science (Orso et al., 2020). More recently, we are facing increased criminal activity
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(Mohler et al., 2020) diffused civil unrest that might not be directly associated with the pan-
demic, but frustration provoked by COVID-19 admittedly fuels it. Hence, given that we face
very similar socio-economic challenges, Machiavelli’s three-step strategy of responding to a cri-
sis remains as pertinent as ever. Its relevance is proven by the fact that many governments are
now admittedly drawing fromMachiavelli’s playbook, within the legal limitations of modern
democracy, to inform their battle with the virus. In this phase, besides the management of the
pandemic and its chances of success, we argue it is essential to focus on what comes next in
terms of survival of our political institutions and democratic system.
Unlike many others in his time, who believed the Plague was a God sent punishment
(Palmer, 1982), Machiavelli was inclined to think that it was nature’s way of controlling the
population. In his works, he seems to explain his view in almost Malthusian terms. Just as
when the human body expels superfluous material during a fever, an overpopulated world
is purged and reshaped by devastating events such as wars or diseases. Though he rarely
spoke to this subject directly, Machiavelli was aware that it is in times of such extraordinary,
extinction-level, events that the endurance of free political institutions was most in danger.
Depending on who emerged victorious, liberty would surrender to either anarchy or tyranny.
Naturally, he wanted to prevent both from happening and ultimately favored a return to the
status quo.
Reading all Machiavelli’s work, we can also imagine his aversion towards a feudal system.
Besides his documented hostility towards Christianity (Parsons, 2016; Lukes, 1984), the cor-
nerstone of the feudal system, which he sees as a religion that delivers power into the hands of
cruel and wicked men, Machiavelli had a very modern view of individual rights (Kirby, 2020;
Gatti, 2017; Sullivan, 2006). A prominent avenue of interpretation of his works has focused
on the concept of “Libertas” concerning a republican mode of government. Colish, for ex-
ample, has pointed out that, in domestic politics, Machiavelli connected liberty with certain
individual rights. She affirms that Machiavelli “clearly identifies freedom with the protection
of private rights” (1971). As Machiavelli was envisioning economics and politics as two inde-
pendent spheres, in his writing, he stated that the highest form of the common good is “the
possibility of enjoying what one has, freely and without incurring suspicion […], the assurance
that one’s wife and children will be respected, [and] the absence of fear for oneself.” (Machi-
avelli, 2009/1531) Consequently, the most extreme form of infringement on the common
good is that upon one’s person and included properties, negating the most basic right of self-
ownership or “body sovereignty.” In The Discourses, for example, Machiavelli made clear that
he believes removing men from the land they own is horrendous and goes against universal
law. ForMachiavelli, not even the power of a King could infringe so dramatically upon human
freedom. He also postulated how a condition of entitlement, supported by political and mil-
itary force, can spring a scenario in that political power both creates and feeds off a system of
privilege. Historically, Feudalism is one the ways of how, according to Rothbard’s definition,
“the State provides a legal, orderly, systematic channel for predation on the property of the
producers; it makes certain, secure, and relatively ‘peaceful’ the lifeline of the parasitic caste in
society.” (Rothbard, 1978) In return, such a parasitic caste, whether composed by individuals,
guilds, or corporations, protect the state frombeing overthrown. The government is, therefore,
naturally incentivized to create such a stratified and polarized system for its own well-being, es-
pecially following the opportunities given by a societal crisis. Creating differences amongst
citizens will then be impacting communities. The recently developed tier system in Califor-
nia, for example, establishes criteria measured at a county level for closures and reopening of
businesses and public services, including schools. While it is certainly a short-term solution to
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contain the spread of COVID19, it is not hard to imagine such a system to be kept in place
and reinforce marginalization and economic deprivation for those who are not in a position
to move to more affordable areas due to lack of resources. Moreover, resorting to scientific
orthodoxy to legitimize such a system, or claim to adopt exclusively evidence-based decisions,
waives any political responsibility for the impact onmarginalized communities. Not much dif-
ferent than invoking the will of God(s), it can be used to justify one’s call in front of a public of
believers, who, despite their deepest convictions, know little or nothing about its functioning.
As pointed out by Feyerabend (Feyerabend &Oberheim, 2011), science, when it is obsessively
mythicized andmakes claims of truth beyond its capacity, can quickly turn itself into a form of
technological tyranny (Todorov, 2001) or, at the very least, be used as a pillar for an autocratic
regime to impose their will beyond any possible doubt. If religion, particularly Christianity
with its rational organizational structure, was the pillar of Feudalism (Duby, 1982) as much as
the source of body sovereignty, post COVID-19 science can be the natural candidate as being
both the pillar of bio-feudalism and the suppressor of the latter.
4 Conclusions
In summary, by comparing the current situation to medieval Florence, Machiavelli tells us
that we are experiencing all the signs of a collapsing social order. It appears that Governments
around theworld are, within the limitations of democratic institutions, applyingmeasures that
are reasonably close to the three steps suggested by the Italian political philosopher. That is un-
doubtedly good news. Nevertheless, we detect a noticeable difference for the protection of the
common good could be also used as an excuse to enact profound changes in the political sys-
tem. Those changes might result in future limitations of democratic processes in order, nomi-
nally, to preserve public health and increase society resilience and the effectiveness of political
response. With no exclusions, political leaders and competitors of most advanced economies
seem to be polarized between a complete denial of scientific expertise in handling the pandemic,
nullifying the efforts to control it, and a complete surrender to a form of scientism that crosses
over religion (Stenmark, 2017; Roy, 2005) and is extremely functional to authoritarian drifts.
As we understand, these are both troubling postures; we believe the current risk for the en-
durance of democratic institutions is mostly represented by the latter. With the masses more
andmore tiredbypolitics, a trend that emerged in the last decades, the temptationof entrusting
scientists with the fate of the world has grown quite large. It must be noticed that it is indeed
met with a comparably strong denialist and conspiracy movement. Hence, the threat is repre-
sented by the longstanding incompatibility between science and democracy, as it is proved by
the scientific process and by the high incentive for politicians to use science as a way to legiti-
mate their goals (Stenico, 2018; Turda, 2006) or even a form of social control free of political
responsibility (Konstańczak, 2013). More than ever, it is necessary to resort to science to solve
complex issues, from COVID-19 to climate change, but decisions over policies must be polit-
ical. Otherwise, the dystopian feudal system we described in this essay might not be that far
away.
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